The 2015 migrant crisis in Hungary: How the government's "fear of small numbers" spread to the nation
Sara Varga | written in 2020
Lake Balaton | Hungary 2014
“The idea of a national peoplehood is the Achilles’ heel of modern society,” as Appadurai (2006, p4) summed up nationalism so well, following the ideas of Hannah Arendt. The way most of Europe handled the 2015 migrant crisis is a great example of the dark side of radical nationalism. The nationalistic beliefs of certain far-right leaders pushed their countries to the extremes through immense control over the media and showed no mercy or sympathy towards immigrants.
In the case of Hungary, having been led by a right-wing political party for a decade, there have been serious concerns about how democratic the country is. Certain Western media outlets called Hungary “a threat to Europe’s mainstream leadership” (Kingsley, 2018).
To understand why the country is so terrified of minority groups, we first need to understand where its people come from. Hungary suffered immense losses and trauma in the twentieth century. After World War I, the country lost two-thirds of its land and 10 million Hungarians found themselves outside Hungary’s borders. 2020 marks a century since the Peace Treaty of Trianon was signed, and it contributed to the large-scale homogenisation of the country (Bocskor et al., 2018).
World War II left even deeper wounds on the nation, having chosen the losing side once again, Hungary was under Soviet occupation for the whole duration of the Cold War. The borders were sealed with no hope for escape until the 1956 anti-Soviet revolution when 200,000 Hungarians fled the country (Bocskor et al., 2018).
Hungary has a long-standing history of marginalising “the weak”, whether it is a minority ethnic group or the homeless. Unsurprisingly, the Romas, the second biggest ethnic group in the country, make up only 3 per cent of the population, whilst 84 per cent are Hungarians (World Population Review, 2020). The Roma, also called Gypsies, have always been associated with crime in Hungary. In the 2010 elections, Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary), a new far-right party, has implemented anti-Gypsy rhetoric as a crucial part of the campaign and has successfully gained 16 per cent of the votes (Vidra and Fox, 2014).
Migration first became a severe issue in the country in 2015, when large numbers of refugees sought asylum in Hungary or used the country as a gateway to Western Europe. Appadurai (2006, p6) discusses the “fear of small numbers” in the context of immigration, saying that the uncertainty about the actual numbers induces anxiety about state-provided benefits and the relationship between “we” and “they.” The “fear of small numbers” can be translated to the “fear of the weak” as the majority feels threatened by the minority through stereotypical beliefs and identity contrast, not based on how dangerous they actually are.
Furthermore, many people are convinced that the number of immigrants is higher than it actually is. Research by the European Commission shows, that in 19 EU member states, people estimate the proportion of non-EU immigrants to be twice as many. In the same survey, 45% of Hungarians stated that immigrants are represented objectively in the media.
Apart from its history, Hungarians have been long influenced by the media and as the country lacks a strong leftist media outlet, the country is left with the same ideology pouring in from all directions. Most Hungarians only consume local or online Hungarian news and, therefore, truly believe in what the media feeds them. The government, however, does not support freedom of speech and according to research published by the European Federation of Journalist, there is large scale media control in Hungary unprecedented in any EU member state. Since Fidesz, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s party took reign, the government has systematically dismantled any form of media freedom or pluralism.
As of now (2020), Hungary ranks 89th on the World Press Freedom Index out of 180 countries, which means the country has dropped by 66 places since Orbán was re-elected in 2010. However, unlike some autocratic regimes in the Middle East, where journalists are jailed or prosecuted for speaking up against the state, the “Hungarian government has pursued a clear strategy to silence the critical press through deliberate manipulation of the media market” (EFJ, 2019). As a result, the media exists in Hungary only as a representative of the state and to support their agendas, let it be an election or anti-immigration campaign.
The media, heavily intertwined with the political leadership, acts as a “primary definer” for those who never met these minorities, in this case, the refugees (Hall et al., 1978). As a result of the media’s anti-migrant agenda, Hungarians were scared of the unknown and the far-right party’s 2018 re-election campaign ousting them was successful hugely due to the excess tabloid media.
Apart from generating anti-immigration news, the media also ruthlessly dissected international news to only focus on the negative aspects of a story. Media framing is a common practice in presenting immigrants as a risk factor and associating them with criminal activity by highlighting certain aspects of reality (Cvrtila, Slijepčević and Levak, 2019).
The fear induced by the media in Hungarian people is still an open wound on the nation. Migrants raping citizens was a common belief among Hungarians because there were ample articles talking about this. “Migrants were immobilized by a discourse that labelled them ‘criminals’ and framed them as a threatening group to be dealt with” (Kallius, Monterescu and Rajaram, 2016, p27). In an article published in July 2020, Hír TV talks about a refugee, who arrived in Germany in 2015 and has raped two underaged girls since. The headline is “Két kislányt is megerőszakolt egy migráns” (A refugee raped two little girls). The consecutive publishing of these sort of news stories is part of the agenda, again, to label all migrants as ‘rapists’ and, essentially, to support the anti-immigration campaign of the government.
The scapegoating of immigrants is highly related to deep-rooted Islamophobia, which can be seen as ‘cultural racism’ (Modood and Werbner, 1997). Again, the media acts as a primary definer, thus strengthening the already existing fear of minorities in the country. Coincidentally, the Paris terror attacks took place in the same year, in 2015, giving rise to panic about terrorism all over Europe. With terrorism, as well as immigration, the “fear of small numbers” is perceived as a relevant factor. Terrorism has always been about invisible panic and scare-mongering, creating a culture of fear, when in reality, the number of such attacks is relatively low compared to other kinds of criminal activity. Additionally, against popular belief, terrorists are not always from the Muslim community.
There are, to this day, countless articles in the Hungarian media about migrants and the ways they are “illegally crossing borders”, sometimes having to dig tunnels under the fences Hungary built (24, 2020). Interestingly, none of these articles mentions their author, which further proves the precarious state of the press in Hungary.
An article published a year ago, titled “Ostromállapot: soha nem látott migrációs hullám közeledik” (State of siege: a never before seen migrant wave is approaching), demonstrates that the issue is still extremely relevant (Origo, 2019). The 230-word article mentions the word ‘illegal’ five times in relation to migrants. Origo, the second most popular media outlet in Hungary, used to be an independent news outlet and was gradually turned into a pro-government organisation by the time the 2015 migrant crisis commenced. Moreover, the press has deliberately used the word ‘migrant’ as an umbrella term for immigrants, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers (Kiss, 2016). This derogatory labelling arguably induced further alienation and lessened sympathy among consumers of the news in the long run.
“We do not want to see any sizeable minority with different cultural characteristics and backgrounds among ourselves; we would like to keep Hungary as the country of Hungarians” as Orbán stated in 2015 (Bocskor et al., 2018). This extreme nationalism can, perhaps, be a result of a homogenous, 95% white population. Hungarians have not been socialised with other races or cultures, and whenever they were mixed throughout history, it was due to war or foreign occupation. Hungary has always scapegoated foreigners or foreign forces for every unfavourable situation that has happened to them.
Kovács and Szilágyi (2013) suggest that it is the victim-victimiser reversal that is to blame for present-day antisemitic discourse in Hungary (cited in Rydgren, 2018, p79-80). The attitude towards antisemitism can be clearly linked to the response to the migrant crisis. It forms a reason as to why Hungarians are prone to transforming victims into perpetrators and vice versa. Evidently, this behaviour culminated in the 2015 migrant crisis, and besides blaming refugees for most criminal activity in that period, the government also foreshadowed future shortcomings that might happen purely as a result of “illegal immigration” (Index, 2015).
Moreover, the European Union’s quota system was seen as responsible for Hungary’s crisis by the government (Kallius, Monterescu and Rajaram, 2016). Hungary’s shift away from a healthy democratic style of leadership did not go unnoticed. The country’s relationship with the EU reached turmoil in 2018 when the European Parliament voted to commence an infringement procedure against Hungary for breaching EU core values (EFJ, 2019).
Having said that, Hungary’s people are not synonymous with their government. The country has seen immense anti-government activism over the past few years, with thousands of people taking to the streets, in an attempt to undermine a far-right xenophobic agenda. Individuals have helped refugees cross the borders and leave the country, while others have donated clothes to those in need (Kallius, Monterescu and Rajaram, 2016). This mentality, however, can mainly be found in Budapest and other large cities, where people have access to foreign news as well as the Hungarian press.
Arguably, citizens of the capital benefit from the multicultural composition of the city. The study suggests that the cultural and ethnic composition of a country have an effect on how accepting its people are. After initially feeling threatened by diversity, people seem to adapt to new, culturally and ethnically mixed environments (Narayanan, 2018).
Conversely, people inhabiting the rural regions of Hungary are deprived of access to all kinds of news, and even if they had access, chances are, there is a language barrier that prevents them from decoding the news. Research into foreign language educations shows that there has been ample improvement in the country since it has joined the EU (Medgyes and Nikolov 2014), but that would only affect younger generations. Middle-aged and elderly people in these areas do not speak any foreign language, thus lack varied media consumption. Hence, they will most likely vote for the ‘safer’ option when it comes to the elections.
In conclusion, the 2015 migrant crisis has evidently brought about a divide between ideologies and political stances. Hungary’s independent media hinges on a thread and is tirelessly fighting for a renewed freedom of speech. This is not an individual issue, it is not only present in Hungary. Many other Eastern European countries face similar problems, and this is a pivotal issue even in countries, where media coverage is more balanced. Even liberal countries are divided over the question. The migrant crisis has attracted a range of opinions from the media because there is no common understanding of the issue.
Media coverage of the migrant crisis in Hungary is a prime example of how the “fear of small numbers” can be induced in a whole nation if a far-right government has a monopoly over the news. The access to only a particular range of information or the lack thereof can lead to biased opinions. Not even journalists are exempt from being associated with the “fear of small numbers” or “cultural racism” in Hungary. Same as politics, the ideas around migration are divided and each person bases their opinions on certain beliefs they were brought up with. The media has immense ability and responsibility, therefore, to change people’s attitudes about certain problems and crises.
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